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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes interest rate spreads and margins in banking in Bangladesh for the period 1990-
2008. The application of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel regression model to a 
panel of 43 banks for the period 1990-2008 reveals persistency in interest spreads and margins. The 
model also identifies that high administrative costs, high non-performing loan ratio and some 
macroeconomic factors are the key determinants of persistently high interest rate spreads and margins. 
Persistently high spreads and margins in old private banks (established before 1999) are attributed to a 
certain degree of market power in the post-liberalization period (after 1999). These factors together 
imply a lack of competition and efficiency in the banking sector of Bangladesh despite financial 
reforms.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial reforms and liberalization should improve efficiency in the intermediation 
process. The interest spread is expected to decline over time as liberalization is accomplished 
and the financial sector develops. The impact of financial reforms on the commercial banking 
can thus be better reflected by the behavior of interest rate spreads (IRS) and margins as these 
are key indicators of financial performance and efficiency of a banking sector. If the spread is 
large, it works as an impediment to the expansion and development of financial 
intermediation. Like in many developing countries, interest rate spread has been perceived to 
be high in Bangladesh since its independence in 1971. The average IRS was estimated to be 
6.13 percent in the 1980s, 6.37 percent in the 1990s and 5.35 percent in the 2000s. Since the 
extent of spread has not changed much in Bangladesh despite financial liberalization in the 
early 1990s1 and repeated concerns expressed by the policymakers, there is an element of 
persistency in spreads. From these concerns, Bangladesh Bank recently adopted interest rate 
control policy by imposing ceilings on lending and deposit interest rates.  
Despite financial reforms, why spreads are persistently high in the Bangladeshi 
banking sector, and thus the apparent inefficiency? What should be the appropriate policy 
measures to reduce spreads and make the sector more efficient? This paper attempts to 
answer these two questions by analyzing the data of 43 banks for the period 1990-2008. Note 
that interest rate spreads in Bangladesh are comparable to those in other South Asian 
countries. The average spreads for the last five years was 6.0 percent in Pakistan, 4.95 
percent in India and 6.18 percent in Sri Lanka2. Thus the Bangladesh case is nothing but a 
typical South Asian case of maintaining moderate but persistent level of spreads. The 
business community and policymakers in Bangladesh are therefore concerned more about 
persistently high level and non-competitive characteristics of spreads. This non-competitive 
structure of spreads could be an obstacle for sustaining high economic growth that critically 
depends on an efficient and competitive financial sector.  
Our understanding of the determinants of spreads and margins in Bangladesh is 
limited. There is no comprehensive study available on spreads and margins with a rigorous 
statistical analysis of bank panel data. This is also a challenging task to analyze spreads and 
                                                 
1 Banks were free to adjust their own rates since February 19, 1997. Further flexibility in the interest 
rate was introduced on July 12, 1999 permitting banks to differentiate interest rates to individual borrowers 
except exporters (Economic Trends, Bangladesh Bank).  
2 Data are obtained from respective country’s central bank. 
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margins in Bangladesh because of limited information on banking businesses3. With such 
limitations, two recent studies, namely Ahmed and Islam (2006) and Mujeri and Islam (2008) 
have highlighted some aspects of interest spreads in Bangladesh. This paper attempts to 
improve our understanding of the spreads and margins in Bangladesh by analyzing: (i) a long 
bank panel data covering the period 1990-2008, and (ii) time-series aggregate data of interest 
rates and loans/deposits. A GMM dynamic panel regression model, Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond has been applied to the data to identify the determinants of spreads and margins as well 
as their persistency. Moreover, this paper analyses long-term behavior of interest rates by 
employing the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) technique and the Granger-causality test to the 
aggregate time-series data. Data are collected from commercial banks’ balance sheets and 
income statements that are available in the repository of the Bangladesh Bank. 
A wide range of studies identified that large spreads occur in developing countries 
mainly due to high operating costs, financial taxation or repression, lack of a competitive 
financial/banking sector and macroeconomic instability (Barajas et al, 1999, Brock and 
Rojas-Suarez, 2000, Chirwa and Machila, 2004, Beck and Hesse, 2009). These factors can be 
summarized into four broad categories: (i) the risk factors, (ii) small financial system factor, 
(iii) market structure, and (iv) macroeconomic factors. Analyzing these factors, this study 
finds that high administrative costs and high non-performing loan ratios are the main 
determinants of high spreads and margins in Bangladeshi banks. Market power, which was 
attributed to the state-owned banks (SCBs) in the pre-liberalization period, has been 
gradually shifted to old and big private commercial banks (PCBs) in the post-liberalization 
period.  
An important contribution of this study is that it applies the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond GMM dynamic panel regression model to capture the persistency of spreads and 
margins by including their lagged values. The results show that both lagged spreads and 
margins are significant, that is, persistency is an important factor in determining the spreads 
and margins in Bangladesh. The persistency in spreads and margins, in other way, captures 
some unobserved characteristics of the banking sector such as managerial revealed 
preferences, their risk-aversion motive as well as corporate governance problem.  
Another interesting feature of this study is that some contrasting results are obtained 
in explaining factors related to ex-ante interest spread and ex-post interest margins. While 
                                                 
3 In recent days, a growing tendency can be seen among banks to be engaged in capital market businesses 
through creating merchant banks, mutual funds and individual trading in the stock markets. However, their 
profits from share-market business are not clearly reported in any of the documents available.     
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bank size, capital ratio, bank rate and tax rate are not significant to interest rate spread, they 
are significant to interest margins. These findings are consistent with some cross-country 
studies (Beck and Hesse, 2009; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2004). 
In addition, aggregate time-series data analysis reveals the fact that spread is sensitive 
to deposit rates, not the lending rate, meaning that any shock to spread eventually transmits to 
the deposit rate. This finding suggests that recently imposed control on the lending rate may 
not help reduce the level of spread in the medium-to-long run as envisaged by the Bangladesh 
Bank.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of literature on interest 
rate spreads. Section 3 provides an overview of the banking sector of Bangladesh. Section 4 
provides a discussion on the behavior of spreads over time. Section 5 discusses about data 
and variables and Section 6 provides an analysis of the determinants of spreads and margins 
using data of a panel of 43 banks for the period 1990-2008. Finally, Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Survey of literature 
What are the determinants of spreads and margins? Does financial liberalization 
decrease the level of spread? These two questions are addressed in most of the studies on 
interest spreads.  A list of studies on the determinants of spreads is given in Table 1 in order 
to make a quick regional and cross-country comparison.  Beck and Hesse (2009) summarize 
the findings on the determinants of spreads and margins under four broad-based views. First, 
the risk-based view encompasses some systematic differences across borrowing sectors and 
deficiencies in the contractual and informational frameworks driving high spreads and 
margins. Factors such as the bank size, capital ratio, bank liquidity, operating costs, non-
performing loan (NPL) and non-interest income are identified by some studies as the 
determinants of IRS. Second, the small financial system view focuses on the fixed transaction 
cost component of financial service provision and the difficulties in exploiting the resulting 
scale economies. Some studies assess this view by looking at the market share of deposits 
and/or loans.   
Third, the market structure view focuses on the competitiveness of the banking system 
and the effect of privatization and foreign bank entry.  Market concentration ratio is often 
used to capture monopolistic competition in the sector. Finally, the macroeconomic view 
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focuses on exchange rates, interest rate policies, inflation rates and GDP growth as driving 
interest spreads and margins in the banking system.  
All these factors together or partially can contribute to high spreads and margins in a less 
developed financial system. Are the determinants alike across countries? Interest spreads are 
fairly higher in developing countries than developed countries. Among developing countries, 
the level of spread is higher in African and Latin American countries than those in Asian 
countries. It can be observed from Table 1 that almost similar factors such as management 
inefficiency, high administrative costs, high non-performing loans, market powers and 
inflation can explain high spreads across countries. Country-specific characteristics do not 
seem to have important implications for higher spreads. 
Studying the determinants of spreads and margins is meaningful only in a financially 
liberalized economy. The empirical evidence regarding the impact of financial liberalization 
on spreads is mixed. While some studies argue that financial liberalization substantially 
reduces spreads (e.g. Honohan, 1999; Fuentes and Basch, 1997; Denizer, 1999), some other 
studies find the opposite scenarios (e.g. Barajas et al., 1999; Chirwa and Mlachila, 2004). The 
contrasting evidence can be explained by the degree of financial reforms, regulatory 
framework in place, institutional strength and other country-specific factors. 
There appears to have some shortcomings in methodologies to study the spread and 
margin. Various types of regression models including pooled OLS, median least squares, 
fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) panel regression, system equation etc. have been 
applied. While FE or RE panel regression models suffer from short-panel bias, other 
regression models mentioned here may not be appropriate to capture some unobserved 
characteristics of firms, such as managerial risk aversion, revealed preferences, governance 
structure etc. Ignoring unobserved firm-level heterogeneity imposes incorrect assumption of 
zero correlation, leading to biased and inefficient estimates. One of the ways to handle the 
problem is to capture persistency in spreads. A suitable model, particularly a dynamic panel 
regression model, can be of useful in this regard. 
Therefore, it appears that more country-specific and cross-country analysis can contribute 
to increased understanding of the determinants of interest spreads and margins. 
 
3. Financial Reforms and Financial Sector Development in Bangladesh: An Overview 
The formal financial sector in Bangladesh, as in other regions of the developing world, 
essentially consists of banks. Although non-bank financial institutions and stock markets 
have been developing in Bangladesh, their influence generally remains marginal compared to 
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the banking sector. The banking sector comprises of 48 banks including 4 state-owned banks 
(SCBs), 30 private commercial banks (PCBs), 5 specialized banks (SBs) and 9 foreign 
commercial banks (FCBs). Bangladeshi banks have been operating in a sound and stable 
macroeconomic environment for the last two decades. During this period, Bangladesh 
registered 5 to 6 percent GDP growth with annual inflation rate ranges between 2 to 9 
percent. The expectation is high on the banking sector as Bangladesh is envisioned to be a 
middle income country by 2020.   
Prior to reforms started in the 1990s, banks were mostly government-controlled and 
political imperatives were consistently given priority over commercial viability. Competition 
between banking institutions remained stifled and banks had little incentive to develop their 
activities. As a result, the institutional capacity of banks to manage the systemic and 
idiosyncratic risks in financial systems has failed to develop sufficiently. In part to remedy 
these problems, Bangladesh underwent financial sector reforms in the early 1990s. These 
reforms, which were part of a broader set of market-oriented, often donor-led reforms, 
generally entailed financial liberalization and institutional reforms to prudential regulation 
systems and distressed government-owned banks. They have succeeded in limiting the scope 
of government intervention in the financial sector and in strengthening prudential regulation 
of financial institutions. Mostly, however, they have not succeeded in significantly deepening 
or diversifying the financial sector.  
In fact, competition has not increased significantly and the banking sector in Bangladesh 
still appears to be oligopolistic. With liberalization toward a market oriented interest rate 
policy under the Financial Sector Reform Program (FSRP) in the 1990s, the banks were 
allowed to set lending and deposit interest rates within bands set by Bangladesh Bank; later 
the bands were removed allowing the banks to set interest rates along the lines of market 
conditions. Finally, other restrictions were removed in 1999 enabling the banks to enjoy 
greater flexibility in setting interest rates. As Table 2 shows, the dominant role of SCBs’ has 
started declining since 1999.  
SCBs’ share in total assets has decreased from 54 percent in 1998 to 31 percent in March, 
2009.  Private banks’ (including foreign banks) share rose from 33 percent in 1998 to 63 
percent in 2009. In 2008, the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP, an indication of the 
monetary resources mobilized by the formal financial sector, was 55 percent in Bangladesh, 
compared with 49 percent in East Asia and the Pacific, and 100 percent in high-income 
countries. In 2008, private sector credit as a ratio of GDP, a key to the intermediary 
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performance of the financial sector, was 55 percent in Bangladesh, compared with 30 percent 
in South Asia and 107 percent in high-income countries (Honohan and Beck, 2007). 
Table 3 presents some indicators of financial development, which display steady 
increasing trend, indicating widening and deepening of the financial system in Bangladesh 
over time. It is also observed that the average credit, deposit and broad money to GDP ratios 
increased substantially from 6.6 percent, 14.9 percent and 19.0 percent respectively over 
1976-1980 to 28.8 percent 35.01 percent and 40.0 percent respectively over 2001-2005. 
Investment as a percent of GDP and per capita income (in current USD) also displays a 
similar pattern and move broadly together reflecting a close association among financial 
development, investment and per capita income during the period. 
Banking sector of Bangladesh, particularly state-owned banks (SCBs), suffer from high 
non-performing loans (around 30% for SCBs in 2008). Contract enforceability is often weak 
in Bangladesh, making legal recourse against defaulting borrowers an uncertain, lengthy and 
costly exercise, which contributes to high non performing loans. The low risk-management 
capacity of banks in Bangladesh is in large part due to the legacy of pervasive state 
interventionism in the financial sector.  
Table 4 presents different types of interest rates for the period 2004 to 2008 (yearly 
average). It is observed that interest rates on trade financing, working capital and consumer 
loan remained higher than the other types of advances. Higher interest rates on working 
capital and trade financing eventually affect private investments. On the other hand, savings 
rates remained fairly stable ranging between 5 and 6 percent during the period under 
consideration, but fixed deposit rates showed an increasing trend. Despite high interest rates, 
non-interest income (e.g. commission and fees) is substantially higher for Bangladeshi banks, 
particularly for FCBs (Figure 2). This high non-interest income may lead banks to continue 
with high spreads and margins. 
To understand the market structure, the market concentration ratios are estimated by 
the Herfindahl-Hircshman Index (HHI) for deposits and loans, which are plotted in Figure 3. 
Both indices indicate that market power has been gradually shifted from SCBs to PCBs after 
liberalization. After 2004, PCBs concentration ratio for loans and deposits has crossed SCBs 
ratios.  Since the PCBs HH index hovers around 4000 in 2008 with an increasing trend, a 
monopolistic competition is expected to prevail in the banking system of Bangladesh. 
 
4. Understanding interest rate spreads in Bangladesh 
4.1 Interest rate spreads and margins 
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The interest rate spread or margin can be defined in many ways. In a narrow 
definition, the spread is calculated by taking difference between the weighted average loan 
rate and weighted average deposit rate for each bank and each year, where the weights are the 
relative amounts of loans or deposits contracted at specific interest rates in the respective year 
and by the respective bank. Under a wide definition, the net interest margin is defined as the 
difference between total interest and commission received over total earning assets and total 
interest paid minus fees over total interest bearing liabilities. 
Estimated spreads and margins are plotted in Figure 4A and 4B respectively. While 
spread shows a declining trend in the case of PCBs, an increasing trend is apparent in the 
cases of SCBs and SBs. For PCBs, spread was estimated to be lower than 5 percent after 
2004, but it is higher than 5 percent for other banks. A Bangladesh Bank statistics showed 
that spread is the highest for FCBs (8.83%)4. Interest margin showed an increasing trend 
except a dip in 2007 due to global recession. FCBs enjoy higher margins than their 
counterparts. 
 
 
4.2 Correlation between spreads and loans/deposits  
Table 5 provides a correlation analysis between spreads and its components, such as 
deposits and loans. Before 1999, the spreads were found to be positively correlated with the 
loan rate and negatively with the deposit rate except for SBs. After 1999, in the case of PCBs, 
spread is found to be positively correlated with large loan and working capital loan rates but 
negatively with savings deposit rates, leaving fixed deposit rate uncorrelated. In the case of 
SCBs, spread is found to be correlated (negatively) only with savings deposit rates.  For SBs, 
IRS is perfectly correlated with large loan rate. An important implication of the correlations 
is that any shock that results in an increased spread will probably raise the lending rate of 
large loans or decrease the deposit rate. This is consistent with the characteristics of banking 
in Latin America in the 1990s (see Brock and Suarez, 2000). 
4.3 The behavior of spreads across time and across banks  
The variation in interest rate spreads is found to be larger in PCBs than in SCBs with an 
increasing trend, particularly after 1999 (Table 6). Though the variation over time is less than 
1 percent, an increasing trend of variation in spreads after 1999 can be explained explicitly by 
financial liberalization measures.  
 
                                                 
4 It was not possible for us to estimate the weighted average IRS for the FCBs due to unavailability of their data 
on loans and deposits. Some of the FCBs do not even publish annual reports; they just send their performance 
report to the respective departments of the Bangladesh Bank. 
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4.4 Long-term behavior of the IRS 
From the analysis of correlation and variation, it is not possible to understand the 
long-term dynamics of spreads. Therefore, the Granger-causality test and VAR analysis are 
performed to understand the long-term behavior of spreads and its components.  
 
4.4.1 Granger-causality Test 
The Granger causality test refers to the effects of past values of one variable on the 
current value of another variable. The purpose of performing Granger Causality test is to 
examine whether the change in spreads is associated with deposit rate or loan rate as well as 
whether respective interest rates are sensitive to interest bearing deposits or loans. Table 7 
(Panel A) presents the results on Granger-causality test for spreads and deposit rates and 
Table 7 (Panel B) presents results on the causality test between spreads and lending rates. 
The results indicate that the change in spread is associated with a change in deposit rate, not 
with a change in lending rate. This implies that any shock to spread is supposed to translate to 
deposit rate in the long run. An important policy implication of this finding is that any ceiling 
on the lending rate, which is now in place, may not help reduce the spread in the long run, 
albeit it may work in the short run. 
Table 8 shows that the amount of both loans and deposits does not matter for their 
respective interest rates. This could be an indication of non-competitive structure of the 
banking system of Bangladesh. Moreover, the insensitivity of interest rates with the amount 
of loans/deposits helps banks keep interest rate spread persistently high. This is an indication 
of a small financial system with lack of depth and alternative saving/lending instruments.  
 
4.4.2 Impulse Responses  
An impulse response analysis with the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) is shown in 
Figure 5. The forecast error variance decomposition tells us the proportion of the movements 
in a sequence due to its “own” shocks versus shocks to other variables. In Figure 5, Panel A 
shows the movements between deposit interest rates (ID) and lending interest rates (IL) and 
their response to each other. Considering 1990 as the initial year, it shows that after 2000 any 
shock to IL has almost translated to ID as their convergence is rapid. This leads to the 
conclusion that there has been a tendency among Bangladeshi commercial banks to keep the 
spread unchanged. Moreover, Panels B and C show that the amount of loans (LLOAN) and 
deposits (LDEPOS) is not responsive to respective interest rates. This indicates that any 
ceiling on lending interest would therefore contribute to the reduction in deposit interest 
rates. The aggregate data analysis indicates that the money market has not yet turned to be 
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competitive. 
To summarize the findings of this section, any change in spreads is caused by a change in 
deposit rates, not the lending rates (long-term perspective). After 2000, any shock to lending 
rates seemed to be translated quickly to deposit rates5. In addition, the amount of loans and 
deposits is not found to be responsive to their respective interest rates, indicating that banking 
sector in Bangladesh is not competitive in a sense that they are not competing among 
themselves for deposit mobilization as well as for exploring lending opportunities. 
5.  Data and Variables 
The bank balance sheet data of 43 banks for the period between 1990 and 2008 are 
used for the analysis6. An unbalanced panel of commercial banks’ interest spreads is used to 
identify the determinants of interest rate spreads and margins in Bangladesh. Explanatory 
variables include variables representing risk factor, market structure, small financial system, 
and macroeconomic factors suggested by the literature.  
The factors that may reflect risk-taking behavior of banks are the bank size, capital 
ratio, bank liquidity, operating costs, non-performing loans (NPL), and non-interest income. 
The logarithm of total asset is used as a measure of bank size. Bank size can be a proxy of 
inefficiency if it is not managed properly, thereby lead to high spreads. Non-interest income 
implies the ratio of commission, fees etc. over interest income. It is likely that banks that 
have higher non-interest income have less incentive to reduce spread. Table 9 shows that 
non-interest income is about 26 percent of interest income. 
Overhead cost is the ratio of administrative costs to total assets. Banks with higher 
operating costs are expected to have higher interest spreads. High overhead cost may result 
from inefficiency in bank operations that may be shifted to bank customers. Bank liquidity is 
defined as the ratio of total operational assets to total bank liabilities. This variable is 
expected to be negatively related to interest spread. An increase in liquidity reduces the bank 
liquidity risk, which reduces the interest spread due to a lower liquidity premium charged on 
loans. Capital ratio is defined as the ratio of shareholders’ equity to total assets. Saunders and 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) provide evidence of the positive and generally significant 
relationship between spreads and capital ratios in developed countries. For developing 
                                                 
5 This observation is commendable because it indicates that the current policy of interest rate cap on the lending 
rates would not help reduce the IRS in the long run, rather it might work in the short run. This has already 
become clearer as the banks are reducing their deposit rates with lending interest cap at 13% to keep the spread almost 
the same as it was before the cap-regime. 
6 Data are not available for all banks for all the years. Because some banks enter newly in different periods and 
some banks merged with another one. Moreover, all the required data are not available in banks’ balance sheet 
particularly for the period before 1999. So this is an unbalanced panel data. 
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countries, if there are limited channels for raising capital, such as thin or underdeveloped 
equity markets, banks will be in a strong position to keep the IRS high. Thus, the capital ratio 
is expected to be negatively associated with the IRS. Since liquidity is highly correlated with 
spread, only capital ratio enters into the model.  
Historically, Bangladeshi banking sector is characterized by high non-performing 
loans, majority given out by state-owned banks. Although private banks have on average 5 
percent NPL of their total loans, the ratio is still around 20 percent for SCBs (Table 9). Banks 
tend to offset the cost of screening and monitoring due to bad loans and/or the cost of 
foregone interest revenue by charging higher lending rates (Barajas et al., 1999). Randall 
(1998), and Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) find support for the positive and significant 
association between spreads and NPL. 
The market share for deposits and loans is used to assess small financial system view 
of interest rate spread. The market share of deposits (MSD) is the share of individual bank’s 
deposit in a year in terms of total deposits including deposits in banks, non-banks, postal 
deposits and national savings directorate (NSD)7 certificate. The market share of loan is the 
share of individual bank’s loans to total loans (both banks and non-banks) in a year. Both the 
deposit and loan share are found to be almost the same, around 2 percent. However, it is 9 
percent for SCBs and 1 percent for PCBs (Table 9). Historically, SCBs have been dominating 
in the share of both deposits and loans in Bangladesh. The variable MSD has of particular 
importance to capture the impact of NSD on spreads, as many argue that higher interest rate 
in NSD creates problems for banks to reduce the lending rate or the IRS. Although the market 
share and thus relative size can be a proxy for size, it also proxies for the relative market 
power of different banks. While a negative relationship between market share and interest 
rate spreads predicts the small financial system view, a positive relationship would predict a 
monopolistic/oligopolistic market structure. 
Several variables, such as financial liberalization index (FLI) indicating a dummy (1 
for year 1999 onward, 0 otherwise), and Herfindahl-Hircshman index (HHI) for loans are 
used to assess the impact of market structure on the IRS. Among macroeconomic factors, 
quantum index of production (QI), inflation, liquidity reserve requirement (LRR) and 
corporate income tax rate (Tax) are considered as potential determinants of the spreads and 
margins. 
                                                 
7 The National Savings Directorate (NSD) certificates are the principal devices of public (non-bank) borrowing for 
financing budget deficit. The interest rate on 3-year NSD certificate has been 11.5% while the same on 5-year 
certificate is 12%. These savings rates are higher than those are offered by banks.  
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Table 10 provides correlations between the variables concerned. In most cases, the 
correlations between spread and employed variables show a positive and significant 
relationship, but far from perfect correlation. 
 
6. Determinants of spread and margin: methodology and results 
Following the discussion in the previous section, the regression model is specified as 
follows: 
titttiti MIBIRS ,,, εδγβα ++++=  
where Bi,t is a vector of bank-specific variables for bank i and time t such as overhead costs, 
liquidity ratio, capital ratio, bank size, NPL, MSD, and non-interest income; It contains time-
varying market and ownership structure variables, such as FLI and HHI; Mt is a vector of 
time-varying macroeconomic variables, such as QI, Inflation, Corporate tax rate and LRR.  
In the banking sector analysis, not all firm characteristics are captured in the available 
data. Information on managerial risk aversion, revealed preferences, governance structure, 
cash flow characteristics and other relevant information may be difficult to measure. Ignoring 
the unobserved firm-level heterogeneity imposes the incorrect assumption of zero correlation 
between the observed variables and the unobserved effect. This leads to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). Including fixed effects in a dynamic panel that 
most of the existing studies on spreads did, however, is also problematic. As first identified 
by Nickell (1981), the firm fixed effect is correlated with the lagged dependent variable. This 
introduces a bias which is substantial with shorter panels, if time-period is small 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2005). The degree of inconsistency is an inverse function of the 
panel length (Nickell, 1981). Judson and Owen’s (1999) simulations indicate that this bias 
can be quite large even for panels with 30 observations per unit. 
To address this short panel bias, there are a number of choices. The first option is to 
use a traditional instrumental variables (IV) approach. If an appropriate IV is available, it can 
be used to instrument for the lagged dependent variable. However, in corporate finance, 
reliable instruments are difficult to find. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalized 
method of moments (GMM, or difference GMM) estimator. They first-difference the panel 
data and then use the endogenous (or predetermined) lagged variables’ levels to instrument 
for the transformed lagged dependent variable. The lagged levels provide little information 
about the first differences when the underlying series are relatively stationary and, therefore, 
are weak instruments (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The Arellano-
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Bover/Blundell-Bond GMM employs additional moment conditions based on the lagged 
variables’ first differences (in addition to their levels) to increase the efficiency of the 
estimation. 
Therefore, to increase the efficiency of the estimates as well as to capture some 
unobserved effects such mangers’ revealed preferences, problems of corporate governance 
etc., the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond GMM model has been applied in the analysis. Table 
11 presents dynamic panel regression estimates on the determinants of interest rate spreads 
and margins for all banks for the period 1990-2008. It also presents estimates for the periods 
before 1999 and after 1999. Although liberalization started in the 1990s, the interest rate 
deregulations completed in 1999. Therefore, the period before 1999 represents partial 
liberalization and after 1999 represents post-liberalization.  
Estimates for the whole period provide evidence for risk-based and market structure 
view and some evidence for macroeconomic view regarding the determinants of interest 
spreads and margins in Bangladesh. Estimates do not provide evidence for small financial 
system view. Lagged interest spreads and margins are found to be significant, indicating 
persistency in interest rate spreads and margins. In other words, persistency of spreads and 
margins capture unobserved characteristics, such as bank managements’ revealed 
preferences, problems of corporate governance, insider operations etc., as well as it reflects 
existence of agency cost problem in the banking sector of Bangladesh. 
Overhead cost and NPL are found to be positively and significantly associated with 
high interest spread for the whole sample period as well as for the post-liberalization period, 
but insignificantly associated with margin. Both the factors indicate inefficiency of the 
management for which the cost has to borne by the customers. For the partially liberalized 
period, capital ratio is found to be negatively associated with spreads. Since the partially 
liberalized period was dominated by SCBs, the low capital base of SCBs created some 
uncertainty on the profitability thereby contributed to high spreads. The coefficient of bank 
size is significant and negative to interest margin, indicating that bigger size significantly 
reduce banks’ margin. If larger banks enjoy scale economies, it can lead them to operate with 
lower average costs. On the other hand, before 1999, bank size was significant and positive to 
spread indicating that larger banks have more market power which was conducive to higher 
spread. 
Market share of deposits (MSD) is not found to be significant, lending no support to 
small financial system view to explaining high spreads or margins. Since MSD is not 
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significant, expectation on more deposit mobilization with the reduction of NSD certificate 
rate may not be realistic as well as it may not help reduce spread. 
Although financial liberalization has no significant effect on spread, it has positive 
and significant effect on interest margin. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) representing 
market concentration on loans has been included in the model. The HHI is found to be 
significant to spreads for all banks for the whole period and for the period before 1999, but 
insignificant for the post-liberalization period.  
From macroeconomic point of view, quantum index (QI) of production is found to be 
positive and significant to spreads. The QI represents an index of industrial production which 
is relevant to investment behavior of firms. A positive association of QI with spread indicates 
that a higher industrial production increases the demand for investments leading to higher 
spreads. On the other hand, inflation is found to be positively associated with spread only for 
the liberalized period.  
Liquidity reserve requirement (LRR), which is currently 20 percent, is found to be 
negative and significant to spread, but positive and significant to interest margin. Reserve 
requirements are a form of financial taxation on commercial banks, therefore, commercial 
banks respond to increases in reserve requirements by increasing the margin between deposit 
and lending rate. Therefore, it may act as a monetary policy instrument to reduce the spread.   
 The coefficients on bank discount rate and corporate tax rate have been found 
significant and negative to interest rate margin, but insignificant to spread. Currently bank 
discount rate is 5 percent and corporate tax rate is 42.5 percent. Particularly, tax rate is 
perceived to be high by bankers, which may contribute to lower margins.  
For PCBs: 
The determinants of interest rate spreads and margins are analyzed separately for 
PCBs. Table 12 presents estimates for all PCBs, new generation PCBs (those were 
established on or after 1999) and old PCBs (those were established before 1999). For all 
PCBs, lagged spreads and margins are found to be significant indicating persistency in 
spreads and margins. The coefficient of overhead cost is found to be positive and significant 
to spread for all PCBs and new PCBs, however, overhead cost is not significant for old PCBs.  
The capital ratio is positive and significant to interest margins for all PCBs, 
particularly for new PCBs. This indicates that high margins contribute to high bank earnings, 
which are channeled into capital base of these banks. The bank size is negative and 
significant to interest margin, indicating that PCBs are operating at economies of scale. 
Herfindahl index is significant to spreads for old PCBs, but it is significant to interest margin 
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in case of all types of PCBs. Therefore, it may be concluded that high spreads and margins in 
PCBs, particularly the older and bigger PCBs are attributed to a certain degree of monopoly 
power. Financial liberalization seems to have widened the interest margins. 
From macroeconomic aspects, while QI is positive, inflation and LRR are negative 
and significant to spreads and margins. While corporate income tax is positively and 
significantly associated, bank rate is negatively and significantly associated with interest 
margin. 
For SCBs: 
Overhead cost, bank size and non-interest income are found to be significant to 
spreads in SCBs. These factors, in other words, indicate inefficiency of the management of 
these banks. Such inefficiencies are attributed to several factors: (i) government intervention 
in loan disbursement as well as in management; (ii) highest number of branches as well as 
employees, which lead to high administrative costs; and (iii) poor service quality of these 
banks. Moreover, IRS in SCBs is partly influenced by macroeconomic environment as 
inflation and LRR are found to be positive and significant. 
Therefore, to make a competitive environment in the banking sector of Bangladesh, 
there is no alternative other than making SCBs more efficient. Strong political will is 
necessary for this purpose. Recently, the government has made SCBs limited companies with 
independent/privately recruited management. However, as the government owns 100 percent 
share of these banks, it is very unlikely that the management could work without any 
intervention of the government. Hence, making these banks competitive and efficient is still a 
far reaching objective.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This study has attempted to explain why interest spreads and margins are persistently high 
in Bangladesh. Like in many developing countries, there is no simple explanation for the 
generally high level of bank spreads and margins in Bangladesh. High operating costs and 
NPL raise spreads in Bangladesh. Also, market power, liquidity reserve requirements act as 
important determinants of a higher spread. From macroeconomic point of view, quantum 
index of industrial production has been found to be significant to spreads. Spreads and 
margins are significantly persistent, indicating to some problems of corporate governance in 
the banking sector of Bangladesh. These findings suggest that financial reforms in 
Bangladesh have not contributed much to make the banking sector competitive and efficient. 
 Moreover, this study finds that any change in spreads is mainly driven by a change in 
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deposit rates, keeping lending rates almost unchanged. As spreads widen due to high lending 
rate or low deposit rate, the cost of using the financial system becomes prohibitive to an 
increasing number of potential borrowers. In this sense, imposing ceiling on spreads instead 
of lending rates, which is currently in place, could be more effective in the short run. 
Thus, the factors that appear to propel high spreads and margins are distortions in the 
loans market, institutional impediments and the policy environment. All these factors 
together imply that banking sector in Bangladesh is not efficient and competitive despite a 
certain degree of financial reforms. A certain degree of monopoly power exists in the system. 
Therefore, it is the combination of several factors that is the cause of concern for Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh Bank should strive for effective monetary policy instruments that can contribute 
to making interest rates responsive to market developments. Corporate governance in the 
banking sector must be improved, particularly in the case of state-owned banks. Making 
state-owned banks more efficient could be considered as one of the ways to make the banking 
sector more vibrant and competitive in the long run. Moreover, institutional development 
such as capital market and bond market development as well as capacity building in 
supervisory activities of Bangladesh Bank could be of useful in making the sector more 
competitive and efficient.  
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Table 1. An international comparison of the determinants of interest rate spreads and margins 
References Country/ Sample period Methodology Determinants of spreads/margins 
A. African countries  
Beck and Hesse 
(2009) 
Uganda. 1999-2005. 
 Average spread: 18%. 
Pooled OLS; 
Median Least 
Square; Fixed 
Effect 
Small market, high operating cost, 
high inflation, high T-bill rate, 
exchange rate appreciation 
Crowley (2007) 18 African countries 
(Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe). 1975-2004. 
Average spread: 7% 
 
Cross-section 
OLS 
Low inflation, greater number of 
banks, greater public ownership of 
banks, poor governance, higher 
reserve ratio  
Chirwa and 
Mlachila (2004) 
Malawi. 1989-99. 
Average spread: 16.75%* 
Fixed effect, 
Random effect 
panel 
regression 
Monopoly power, reserve 
requirements, discount rate, inflation 
B. Eastern Caribbean countries. 
Randall (1998) Eastern Caribbean countries 
(Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines). 
1991-96. 
Average spread: 7.3% 
Two-stage 
least square 
Operating cost, loan loss provision 
C. Latin American countries 
Brock and Rojas-
Suarez (2000) 
Latin America. 1991-1995. 
Argentina (12.9%), Bolivia 
(7.1%), Colombia (21%), Chile 
(11.6%), Peru (20%), Mexico 
(7.7%). 
Two-step 
regression 
Capital ratio, cost ratio, liquidity 
ratio, interest rate volatility, inflation 
Barajas et al. 
(1999) 
Colombia. 1974-1996. 
Average Spread: 16-32% 
(1974-1988); 25-19% (1988-
1996)* 
Two-stage 
least squares 
Operating cost, financial taxation, 
loan quality 
D. OECD countries 
Saunders and 
Schumacher 
(2000) 
7 OECD countries (Germany, 
Spain, France, U.K., Italy, 
USA, Switzerland). 
Two-step 
regression 
Capital ratio, monopoly power, 
volatility of interest rates 
Angbazo (1997) US. 1989-1993   De fault risk, opportunity cost of non-
interest bearing reserves, leverage, 
management efficiency 
E. South Asian Countries 
Mujeri and Islam 
(2008) 
Bangladesh Summary 
Statistics
Not available 
Ahmed and Islam 
(2006) 
Bangladesh Summary 
statistics 
Limited competition, overstaffing, 
high administrative costs, the burden 
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of NPLs, and above all, congruence 
between monetary and fiscal policy 
stances. 
Khawaja (2007) Pakistan. 1998-2005. Fixed effect 
model 
Inelasticity of deposit, Liquidity, NPL 
F. Cross-country Analysis 
Beck and Hesse 
(2009) 
Cross-country. 86 countries; 
2000-2004; 
Average spread: 5% 
Cross-
sectional OLS 
Bank size, Real T-bill rate, Liquidity 
ratio, Concentration, Inflation, GDP 
growth, institutional deficiencies, 
overhead cost 
Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga 
(1999) 
Cross-country (80). 1988-1995 Cross-
sectional OLS 
Ratio of equity to lagged total asset, 
ratio of loans to total assets, foreign 
ownership, bank size, overhead cost, 
inflation rate, short-term market 
interest rate 
*Estimation of spread depends on a particular definition. 
Table 2: Scenario of the Banking sector in Bangladesh (as of March, 2009) 
Bank type Number Number of branches Percentage of 
total asset 
Percentage of 
total deposit Rural Urban Total 
State owned 
(SOBs) 
4 2146 
(63.4%) 
1240 
(36.6%)
3386 
(100%) 
30.66 48.07 
Private 
commercial 
banks (PCBs) 
30 634 
(30.3%) 
1461 
(69.7%)
2095 
(100%) 
 
53.71 29.71 
Specialized 
banks (SBs) 
5 1206 
(88.5%) 
157 
(11.5%)
1363 
(100%) 
6.08 8.31 
Foreign Banks 
(FCBs) 
9 0 56 
(100%)
56 
(100%)
9.55 13.91 
Total 48 3986 
(57.8%) 
2914 
(42.2%)
6900 
(100%) 
100.00 100.00 
Source: Bangladesh Bank 
 
Table 3: Financial intermediation in Bangladesh  
Period  
average  
Interest 
rate  
(lending) 
Credit to 
private 
sector 
(% of 
GDP)  
Total 
deposits 
(% of 
GDP)  
Broad 
money  
(% of 
GDP  
Gross fixed capital 
formation (gross 
investment) (%GDP) 
GDP per 
capita at 
current US 
dollar  
1976-
1980  11.09  6.59  14.86  19.03  10.44  160.0  
1981-
1985  13.68  13.67  20.23  24.54  10.51  192.0  
1986-
1990  14.71  19.08  24.75  28.67  13.87  242.0  
1991-
1995  13.90  16.58  23.07  26.68  17.93  283.0  
1996-
2000  13.83  23.17  26.7  31.01  21.51  353.0  
2001-
2005  12.33  28.83  35.08  40.02  22.63  395.0  
2006-
2008 13.40 34.5 45.0 45.0 24.4        565.5 
 Sources: Bangladesh Bank and Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 4. Interest rate structure across banks in Bangladesh (yearly average) 
Year 
Savings  
rate 
Fixed 
deposit  
rate 
Interest 
on  
agri 
loan 
Interest 
on  
large 
term 
loan 
Interest 
on  
small 
term 
loan 
Interest 
on  
working 
capital 
Interest 
on 
exports 
Interest 
on 
 trade 
financing 
Interest 
on 
house 
financing 
Interest 
on  
consume
rs loan 
2004 5.50 7.60 9.37 11.50 10.88 11.88 7 12.49 10.02 7.29 
2005 5.56 7.91 9.41 11.61 10.97 12.01 7 12.59 10.15 8.81 
2006 5.99 9.59 9.92 13.19 12.08 13.59 7 14.30 12.95 13.66 
2007 5.99 9.82 9.93 12.90 11.98 13.75 7 14.41 12.98 14.16 
2008 5.95 10.98 10.41 12.48 12.10 13.07 7 14.07 12.85 14.56 
Author’s estimate 
 
Table 5: Correlation of spread with loan and deposit rate  
 Loan rate Deposit rate 
 Agriculture Large loans Small loans Working 
capital 
Savings Fixed  
Panel A. Before 1999 
PCBs 0.50 0.38 0.54 0.44 -0.45 -0.53 
SCBs 0.05 -0.47 -0.52 -0.43 -0.57 -0.61 
SBs -0.39 0.99 0.61 0.56 0.47 0.59 
Overall 0.10 0.04 0.40 0.27 -0.47 -0.43 
Panel B. After 1999 
PCBs 0.25 0.39 -0.05 0.48 -0.51 -0.05 
SCBs -0.03 0.14 -0.10 -0.19 -0.44 -0.34 
SBs -0.39 0.99 0.61 0.56 0.47 0.59 
Overall -0.17 0.90 -0.07 0.22 -0.24 -0.02 
 
Table 6: Coefficients of variations in spreads for PCBs and SCBs over the years  
Year PCBs SCBs Overall Year PCBs SCBs Overall 
1993 0.10 0.04 0.09 2001 0.30 0.08 0.28 
1994 0.15 0.05 0.13 2002 0.28 0.22 0.27 
1995 0.16 0.05 0.14 2003 0.39 0.13 0.36
1996 0.13 0.03 0.11 2004 0.37 0.11 0.34 
1997 0.13 0.25 0.16 2005 0.42 0.12 0.39 
1998 0.22 0.03 0.18 2006 0.42 0.13 0.39
1999 0.21 0.14 0.19 2007 0.32 0.15 0.31 
2000 0.24 0.09 1.41 2008 1.01 0.29 0.91 
Source: Author’s estimate 
 
Table 7: Granger-causality test between spread and interest rates, 1990-2008 
Panel A. Causality between IRS and Deposit rate 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  ID does not Granger Cause IRS 13  0.37  0.69 
  IRS does not Granger Cause ID  6.74  0.02 
Panel B. Causality between IRS and lending rate 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  IL does not Granger Cause IRS 13  0.34  0.72 
  IRS does not Granger Cause IL  0.23  0.79 
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Table 8: Pair-wise Granger Causality tests: 1990-2008 
Panel A: Causality between interest bearing deposits and deposit interest rates 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  INTDEPOS does not Granger Cause ID 17  1.28  0.31 
  ID does not Granger Cause INTDEPOS  0.17  0.84 
Panel B: Causality between total loan and lending rates  
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  TOTLOAN does not Granger Cause IL 17  0.51  0.61 
  IL does not Granger Cause TOTLOAN  1.13  0.35 
 
 
Table 9: Summary statistics of key variables 
stats 
Interest 
spread 
Overhead 
cost as % 
of total 
asset 
Capital 
ratio as 
% of 
total 
asset 
NPL as 
% of 
total 
loan 
Liquidity 
Reserve 
Ratio (%) 
Non-
interest 
income 
as % of 
interest 
income MSD 
Loan 
Share 
 
All 
banks 
 
5.18 
1.70 
0.33 
0.05 
0.48 
9.08 
0.20 
1.30 
6.39 
9.00 
0.10 
1.23 
19.57 
1.73 
0.09 
26 
0.17 
0.67 
.02 
0.03 
1.82 
0.02 
0.03 
0.45 
SCBs         
mean 5.83 4.00 0.14 16 22.21 23 0.09 0.10 
sd 0.91 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.60 0.12 0.06 0.05 
cv 0.16 0.66 0.86 0.75 0.03 0.50 0.69 0.45 
SCBs (year>1999) 
mean 5.45 2.00 0.04 21 22.45 25 0.08 0.10 
sd 0.81 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.61 0.09 0.05 0.05 
cv 0.15 0.34 0.89 0.55 0.03 0.34 0.66 0.45 
PCB 
mean 5.01 6.00 0.22 7 20.01 24 0.01 0.015 
sd 1.82 0.58 1.57 0.10 1.13 0.13 0.01 0.01 
cv 0.36 9.18 7.05 1.36 0.06 0.55 0.87 0.79 
PCBs NEW 
mean 3.75 14.0 0.42 3 19.48 20 0.01 0.017 
sd 2.00 1.14 3.08 0.03 1.35 0.11 0.00 0.01 
cv 0.53 8.34 7.35 0.85 0.07 0.54 0.83 0.71 
PCBs OLD 
mean 5.42 4.0 0.16  8 20.12 25 0.01 0.015 
sd 1.56 0.02 0.16 0.10 1.07 0.14 0.01 0.01 
cv 0.29 0.62 1.01 1.31 0.05 0.55 0.81 0.77 
PCBs (YEAR>1999) 
mean 4.62 7.0 0.21 7 20.25 21 0.01 1.66 
sd 1.88 0.71 1.92 0.10 1.09 0.09 0.01 1.29 
cv 0.41 10.40 9.33 1.38 0.05 0.43 0.82 0.77 
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Table 10. Pair-wise correlation between bank-specific variables 
  
Interest 
spread 
Over 
head 
Capital 
Ratio NPL 
Bank 
size 
Non 
interest 
income MSD HHI QI Inflation LRR 
Interest 
spread                      
Overhead -0.12*       
Capital ratio -0.11* 0.99*                  
NPL 0.16* -0.15* 0.12*                
Bank size 0.05 -0.21* -0.24* 0.19*              
Non-interest 
income 0.24* 0.001 0.03 0.01 -0.15 *            
MSD 0.15* -0.01 -0.02 0.30* 0.57* 0.01          
HHI 0.16* -0.01 -0.002 0.21* 0.45* -0.05 0.86*        
QI -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.14* -0.20*      
Inflation -0.23* -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.23* -0.001 -0.03 -0.09* 0.15*    
LRR -0.06 0.003 -0.03 0.20* 0.88* -0.08 0.56* 0.44* 0.05 0.25*  
Tax -0.12* 0.01 -0.002 0.03 0.02 -0.13* -0.03 0.02 
-
0.15* -0.23* 0.05 
* Significant at 5 percent level. 
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Table 11: Determinants of interest spreads and margins for all banks 
Interest Spread Interest margin 
   
 All Banks  
All banks  
(before 
1999)  
   
All banks 
(after 
1999)  
   
   
 All Banks  
All banks  
(before 1999) 
   
All banks (after 
1999)  
   
Lagged 
interest spread  
0.42 
(0.06)***  
0.33(0.09)*
**  
0.36 
(0.08)*** 
0.63 
(0.03)*** 0.45 (0.04)*** 0.54 (0.04)***
Overhead  
15.92 
(6.63)***  3.98 (6.59) 
20.81 
(9.12)*** 0.23 (0.57) -0.29 (0.59) -0.25 (0.65)
Capital ratio  
-1.27 
(1.05)  
-1.90 
(0.73)*** 
-1.36 
(1.87) 0.36 (0.08)** 0.07 (0.05) 0.20 (0.10)**
NPL  
2.18 
(1.19)*  -1.80 (1.21) 
3.00 
(1.60)**  -0.04 (0.09) 0.19 (0.11)* 0.00 (0.11)
Bank size  0.77(0.71)  
2.39 
(1.01)***  
1.38 
(0.96)  
-0.38
(0.05)***-0.62 (0.06)*** -0.40 (0.06)***
Non-interest 
income  0.22(0.85)  -0.36 (0.69) 
0.20 
(1.32)  0.13 (0.07)* 0.00 (0.04) 0.07 (0.11)
MSD  -0.76(2.99)  2.51 (2.83) 
-1.54 
(4.02)  0.14 (0.30) 0.27 (0.22) -0.24 (0.39)
HHI  
0.00(0.00)
***  
-0.01 
(0.00)***  
0.00 
(0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
QI  
0.00(0.00)
***  
-0.01 
(0.01)**  
0.00 
(0.00)*** 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00)
Inflation  -0.02(0.02)  
0.07 
(0.02)***  
-0.05 
(0.03)  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
FLI  -0.33(0.27)  -0.08 (0.23) 0.20(0.03)***  
LRR  
-
0.73(0.26)
***  
0.11  
(0.27)  
-0.97 
(0.35)*** 
0.13
(0.01)***
0.23
(0.02)*** 0.13   (0.02)***
Bank rate  -0.02(0.03)  
1.34(0.64)*
**  
-
0.03(0.04) 
-0.01
(0.00)*** 0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.00)***
Tax  -2.52(2.33)  -5.11(7.89) 
-
3.66(5.04) 
-0.88
(0.22)*** 0.64 (0.53) 0.21 (0.31)
Constant  
8.70(3.61)
***  
-19.76 
(6.30)*** 
7.28 
(4.88) 
1.61
(0.34)*** 0.76 (0.78) 1.31 (0.41)***
N  300  80  220  332 72 260 
Wald χ2 test  176.23***  48.65***  123.7***  2127.41*** 9308.43*** 564.85*** 
Sargan Test 
(χ2 value) 8 190.75***  52.55***  140.85*** 
357.82*** 40.26*** 254.09*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses.*** and ** indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The Sargan test is employed to test the joint validity of GMM estimates. As the Sargan test (1958) implies, the 
instruments used are orthogonal to the error term.  
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Table 12: Determinants of interest spreads and margins for PCBs 
Interest Spread 
Interest margin 
 PCB 
  
PCB 
(after 
1999) 
  
PCB 
NEW 
BANKS 
  
PCB 
OLD 
(after 
1999)
 PCB 
PCB (after 
1999) 
PCB (new 
banks) 
  
PCB old 
banks (after 
1999)
Lagged 
interest 
spread 
0.41 
(0.07)*** 
0.30 
(0.09)*** 
0.34 
(0.19)**
0.46 
(0.07)***
-0.06
(0.03)***
-0.08
(0.03)***
0.02
(0.02)
0.70
(0.04)***
Overhead 
16.08 
(7.58)*** 
16.75 
(9.60)* 
20.53 
(20.18) 
3.52 
(8.20) 
0.32
(0.25)
0.32
(0.31)
0.94
(0.22)***
-1.37
(0.77)*
Capital 
ratio 
-0.85 
(1.16) 
-1.39 
(2.17) 
-0.89 
(8.93) 
0.39 
(1.07) 
0.14
(0.04)***
0.00
(0.05)
0.96
(0.11)***
0.09
(0.11)
NPL 2.49 (1.65) 
2.74 
(1.87) 
-0.04 
(10.53) 
1.91 
(1.43) 
0.00
(0.04)
0.07
(0.05)
-0.19
(0.09)**
-0.07
(0.11)
Bank size 1.17 (0.98) 
1.09 
(1.27) 
1.51 
(5.00)
0.44 
(1.24)
-0.54
(0.03)***
-0.60
(0.04)***
-0.19
(0.06)***
-0.18
(0.07)***
Other 
income 0.42 (0.90) 
-0.40 
(1.45) 
5.41 
(5.16) 
0.63 
(0.82) 
0.05
(0.03)*
0.11
(0.05)***
0.13
(0.05)***
0.07
(0.11)
MSD 
-9.57 
(13.23) 
-19.56 
(18.93) 
-205.56 
(314.46)
-4.08 
(12.09) 
0.01
(0.50)
-0.08
(0.76)
1.03
(2.18)
-0.68
(0.41)*
HHI 0.02 (0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(0.02)** 
0.00
(0.00)**
0.00
(0.00)**
-0.02
(0.00)***
0.00
(0.00)
QI 
0.00 
(0.00)*** 
0.00 
(0.00)*** 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Inflation 
-0.06 
(0.03)** 
-0.10 
(0.05)*** 
-0.08 
(0.20)
-0.06 
(0.03)***
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)***
0.00
(0.00)
FLI 
-0.24 
(0.31)       --          -- 
-0.24 
(0.34) 
0.08
(0.01)***
  
  
  
  
  
  
Tax 
-3.03 
(2.91) 
-5.21 
(3.67) 
-18.58 
(20.35) 
-5.21 
(3.67) 
0.21
(0.01)***
0.24
(0.02)***
0.11
(0.02)***
0.06
(0.02)***
LRR 
-0.88 
(0.37)*** 
-0.81 
(0.44)** 
-0.20 
(1.75) 
-0.78 
(0.43)* 
-0.01
(0.00)***
-0.01
(0.00)***
0.00
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)***
Bank Rate 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.28 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.51
(0.11)***
-0.07
0.17
-0.75
(0.19)***
-0.39
(0.34)
Constant 
7.76 
(4.58)* 
8.13 
(6.55) 
-7.73 
(27.98) 
12.63 
(5.51)***
1.43
(0.17)***
1.41
(0.20)***
0.12
(0.31)
0.85
(0.45)**
N 235 185 52 185
 
263
 
212
 
56 
 
204
Wald χ2 
test 173.5*** 128.79*** 18.89 128.79** 
 
.75*** 
 
473.65*** 
 
3181.33*** 
 
534.04***
Sargan 
Test (χ2 
value) 173.03*** 121.77** 35.97 121.78** 
 
 
229.06*** 
 
 
196.95*** 
 
 
50.22 
 
 
183.23***
Standard errors are in parentheses.*** and ** indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26
Table 13: Determinants of interest spreads and margins for SCBs 
Interest Spread 
Interest margin 
 All SCBs 
 
All SCBs after 
1999 
 All SCBs 
 
All SCBs after 1999
Lagged interest spread 0.22 (0.16) 0.07(0.15) 0.36 (0.14)*** 0.14 (0.16) 
Overhead 23.48(12.65)** 53.95(18.71)*** -0.03 (0.14) -0.09 (0.15) 
Capital ratio -3.89(2.66) -6.12(3.17)** -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 
NPL -0.35(1.27) -0.11(2.53) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Bank size -5.54(1.63)*** -6.36(4.61) 0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.05) 
Non-interest income 4.88(2.77)* 6.04(2.30)*** -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
MSD 1.74(2.62) 0.83(3.62) 0.01 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 
HHI 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.00)** 
QI 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Inflation 0.09(0.04)*** 0.06(0.07) 0.00 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00) 
FLI -0.17(0.29)  -- -0.01 (0.01)  
LRR 1.25(0.65)** 1.69(1.77) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Constant 35.86(6.88)*** 35.52(16.51)*** -0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.17) 
N 53 37 53 37 
Wald χ2 test 55.35*** 35.55*** 134.23*** 80.3*** 
Sargan Test (χ2 value) 40.81 31.18 41.36 28.32 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.*** and ** indicate significance at 1 and 5 percent level respectively. 
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Figure 1. Trends in non-performing loan 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Commission and fees as % of interest income 
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Figure 3(A). HH Index for loans 
 
 
 Figure 3(B): HH Index for deposits 
 
 
Figure 4A: Bank Interest Rate Spread in Bangladesh 
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Figure 4B: Interest Rate Margin in Bangladesh 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Impulse response of interest rates, loans and deposits  
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Panel B  
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Appendix: 
Table A1: List of Banks  
 
State-owned Commercial 
Banks (SCBs) 
Local Private Commercial Banks 
(PCBs) 
Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs) Specialized Banks (SBs) 
• Agrani Bank Limited 
• Janata Bank Ltd 
• Sonali Bank Ltd 
• Rupali Bank Ltd. 
• BASIC Bank Limited 
• Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
• Bangladesh Shilpa Bank 
• AB Bank Limited 
• A L-Arafa Islami Bank LTD 
• BRAC Bank Limited 
• Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd. 
• Bank Al-Falah Limited 
• Bank Asia 
• Dhaka Bank 
• Dutch-Bangla Bank Ltd 
• EXIM Bank Limited 
• Eastern Bank Limited 
• First Security Islami Bank Ltd 
• ICB Islami Bank 
• IFIC Bank Limited 
• Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 
• Mercantile Bank Ltd 
• Mutual Trust Bank 
• National Bank Limited 
• National Credit and Commerce Bank Limited 
• One Bank Limited 
• Premier Bank Limited 
• Prime Bank Ltd 
• Pubali Bank Ltd 
• Rupali Bank Ltd 
• Shahjalal Bank Ltd 
• Southeast Bank Ltd 
• Standard Bank Ltd 
• The City Bank Ltd 
• Trust Bank 
• United Commercial Bank 
• Uttara Bank Limited 
• Citibank N.A 
• Commercial Bank of Ceylon 
• Habib Bank Ltd 
• Standard Chartered Bank 
• State Bank of India 
• The Hong Kong and Sanghai Bank Ltd 
• Woori Bank 
 
